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[38 0.2d

warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground that it cannot be ascertained ·which instruction was followed by the
jury."
[ would therefon~ reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 16,
1952. Carter, J ., \Yas of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[L. A. Ro. 21794.

In Bank.

Apr. 22, 1952.]

GLADYS HOGAN, as Executrix, etc., Appellant, v. R. F.
INGOLD et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-By bringing a stockholder's derivative
action the plaintiff nominates hin:tself to act in a fiduciary
capacity substantially as a guardian acl litem for the corporation, and he has no vested property right which compels
the court to accept him unconditionally in that capacity.
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-Corp. Code, § 834, prescribing the conditions precedent to maintenance of a stockholder's derivative action, is
not designed and does not operate to deprive a shareholder
of any vested property right.
[3] !d.--Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-Sinee Corp. Code, § 834, is directed only at actions
instituted or maintained "in the right" of the corporation,
it has no application to actions or suits seeking directly to
enforce personal rights of shareholders.
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-A stockholder does not bring an action on behalf of
a corporation because his rights have been directly violated,
or because the cause of action is his or because he is entitled
to the relief soug·ht; he is permitted to sue in this manner
simply to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court.
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-A stockholder who institutes an action on behalf of a
corporation is a trustee, seeking in the name of another a recovery for wrongs which have been committed against that
[1] See Cal.Jur., Corporations, ~ 456; Am.Jur., Corporations,
§ 461.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6-11, 14, 15] Corporations, § 353;
[ 5] Corporations, § 360; [12, 13] Costs, § 3.
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other; his position in the litigation is similar to that of a
guardian ad litem, and he is not pc~rmitted to take any act
without sanction of the court.
[6a, 6b] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of
Corporation.-Formulation of regulations for a stockholder's
derivative action, including determination of what qualifications shall be required of a plaintiff in order that he may institute and maintain a suit in equity "in the right" of another,
is a matter manifestly appropriate for state legislation, which
must be upheld so long as no constitutional rights are invaded.
[7] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-Since Corp. Code, § 834, is applied only to actions
instituted after its enactment, it is neither substantive in
character nor retroactive in operation; it docs not in and of
itself create any liability or deprive anyone of property or of
any vested right either with or without clue process, nor does
it impair the obligation of any contract.
[8] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-Corp. Code, § 834, applies to a fiduciary action
brought in respect to wrongs assertedly perpetrated before the
statute as well as to wrongs happening after the statute, as
long as the action is brought after the effective elate of the
legislation.
[9] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-·whether a stockholder's derivative action concerns
wrongs all<>geclly committed before or after the elate Corp.
Code, § 834, became effective, the operation of the statute is
prospective and procedural because it does not deprive a
person of any right which he had at the time of beginning
the suit, but merely prescribes the conditions on which the
subsequently in~tituted equity suit may be brought and maintained.
[10] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-It is only in rrspect to a stockholder's claimed unconditional right to institute nnd maintain the fiduciary action
in the right of tlw corporation, and to be unconditionally
accepted by the court in that capacity, that the stockholder's
elaim of impairment goe~; Corp. Code, ~ 834, does not abolish
stockholder's derivative suits, but merely imposes regulatory
conditions on their institution and maintenance.
[11] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corporation.-That part of Corp. Code, § 834, which authorizes
[11] Constitutionality, construction and application of statutes
requiring security for costs or e.xpenses in case of stockholder's
aetion in right of corporation, note, 159 A.L.R. 978.
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the court on motion and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion to require . tb.at :riaintiff in a derivative suit furnish
security for "the probable reasonable expenses, including. attorney's fees," of th~ defendants sued, "which will b~ in~urred
·in the defense of the action?' and which requires dismissal of
the action on p1ai]1tiff's failure to comply with the order within
. a reasonable time :fixed by the court, is not retroactive when
· applied to actions subsequently commenced even though the
cause of action accrued before enactment.
[12] Costs""'-What Law GoV:erns,~Costil are given only by statutory direction and their allowance depends on the terms of the
statute at the tinie t)f the accrual of the right to have them
··
taxed.
[131 Ia.-.:.what Law Governs.'-'-Whetl;ter costs may be allowed in
an action pr suit, 'as well as determination of the method of
their computation, is governed by th.eiaw as it exists at the
time of the judgment whi~h terminates the action. or suit,
rather thlj.n by the law as it existed at the time whenthe
action o~ .suit was col:nme~eed, where there is. no. provision
iri connection with the new. legislation which «J1early saves
or excepts therefrom> costs iU: pendiJlg actions.
[14] .•. Oo:rporations--Stock:h~l(lel's~Suing and Defending. on ~ehalf
of Oornoratl.on.-'l'here .is nothing in Corp. Code, § 4, declaring
that "Np ~.etion . . . con:nnen.ced before tliif) code takes ef£ect,
andnorig'lit a.e.e:rued,·is affeeted ..by. the provisio:ns of this code,
but ~ll proce<lure thereafter• take11 therein. shall conform. to the
provisions of this code so :fat as possible," which implies that
Gorp. Code, § 834; shall not be .applied .to actions commenced
.after ~ts effective date.
. .. ··..
[15] Id;:-Stocltholders.,.;:_Su:ing and D~fending On ~ehalf ot Oorporation.--,.SiMe power. of state· over institut1on ·a:nd rnainte-.
nance. of stockholder's derivative actions. is plenary, there is
no .''right. accrued" in the shareholder to he dec.ted, and· t]Ie
d.e.elared policy· o;f' the.state as. to• aJ:l procedure to be taken in
such a.ctious l'l,fter · the effeetiye d.ate of Corp. Code, § 8S41
should be &'iven effect;
·

APPEAL from an orjler of the Superior. Court of. Los
Angeles County dismissing a ~t9e:Rholp.er's 4eriv£l;tive action.
Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmeq. ·
M~LaiigJ:tlin· & ••

casey for

_Appel~ant .

. [IS] Statute relatingto 13osts or attor11eys' ;f~es at commeneement or.at termiAationo£ ~~tion.as. controlling, note, 9~ A.L.E,.
1428. See; also,, Oal.Jur., Costs, §§ 2,. 43; All1~Jur., Cost~, §§ 31 4c.

Apr. 1952]

HoGAN

v.

INGOLD

805

[38 C.2d 802; 243 P.2d 1]

Kenny & Morris and Robert vV. Kenny, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
Flint & MacKay, William R. Flint, Roscoe C. Andrews,
J.D. Willard and Hunter & Liljestrom for Respondents.
SCHAUER, ,J.-This case presents to this court for the
first time the question as to whether section 834 of the
Corporations Code 1 (Stats. 1949, ch. 499, § 1) is validly applicable to a stockholder's derivative suit commenced after the
effective date of the statute but concerning wrongs allegedly
committed before that date and which suit is instituted by a
shareholder who acquired his stock otherwise than by operation of law, and at a time subsequent to the commission of
the wrongs complained of but prior to enactment of the statute. We conclude that the statute is procedural, that application of it here is prospective and does not divest the plaintiff of any substantive vested right, and that the order of the
trial court dismissing the action for failure to furnish security
for costs and expenses as required should be affirmed.
The legislation in question imposes two principal conditions
on the institution and maintenance of stockholder's derivative
suits: (1) The complaint must allege that plaintiff "was a
1
Section 834: " (a) No action may be instituted or maintained in
the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders
of shares, or of voting trust certi:flcates representing shares, of such corporation unless both of the following conditions exist:
"(1) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he was a registered
shareholder or the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of
the transaction or any part thereof of which he complains or that his
shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon him by
operation of law from a holder who was a holder at the time of the
transaction or any part thereof complained of.
"(2) The plaintiff R.lleges in the complaint with particularity his
efforts to secure from the board of directors such action as he desires
and alleges further that he has either informed the corporation or such
board of directors in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of
action against each defendant director or delivered to the corporation
or such board of directors a true copy of the complaint which he proposes to file, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or
the reasons for not making such effort.
" (b) In any such action, at any time within thirty days after service of summons upon the corporation or any defendant, the corporation or such defendant may move the court for an order, upon notice
and hearing, requiring the plaintiff to furnish security as hereinafter
provided. Such motion may be based upon one or more of the following grounds:
"(1) That there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution
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registered shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction or
any part thereof of which he complains'' or that the shares
devolved npon him by operation of law from one who was
a registered shareholder at such time. (2) On motion (on the
grounds specified in the statute and hereinafter epitomized)
the court may require the plaintiff to furnish security for
"the probable reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
of the corporation and the moving party which will be incurred in the defense of the action.'' On failure to furnish
the required security within a reasonable time to be fixed by
the court ''the action shall be dismissed.''
The grounds upon which the motion for security may be
based are : (a) That there is no reasonable probability that
prosecution of the cause of action alleged against the moving
of the cause of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party
will benefit the corporation or its security holders;
"(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not
participate in the transaction complained of in any capacity.
'' 'l'he court on application of the corporation or any defendant may,
for good cause shown, extend such 30-day period for an additional
period or periods uot exceeding sixty days.
''At the hearing upon such motion, the court shall consider such
evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be material:
(a) to the ground or grounds upon which the motion is based, or
(b) to a determination of the probable reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, of the corporation and the moving party which will
be incurred in the defense of the action. If the court determines, after
hearing the evidence adduced by the parties at the hearing, that the
moving party has established a probability in support of any of the
grounds upon which the motion is based, the court shall fix the nature
and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff for reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by the
moving party and the corporation in connection with such action, including expenses for which said corporation may become liable pursuant to
Section 830. A determination by the court that security either shall or
shall not be furnished or shall be furnished as to one or more defendants and not as to others, shall not he deemed a determination of any one
or more issues in the action or of the merits thereof. The corporation
and the moving party shall have recourse to such security in such
amount as the court shall determine upon the termination of such
action. The amount of such security may thereafter from time to time
be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court upon showing
that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.
If the court, upon any such motion, makes a determination that security
shall be furnished by the plaintiff as to any one or more defendants,
the action shall be dismissed as to such defendant or defendants, unless
the security required by the court shall have been furnished within such
reasonable time as may be fixed by the court.
" (c) If any such motion is filed, no pleadings need he filed by the
corporation or any other defendant, and the prosecution of such action
shall he stayed, until 10 days after such motion shall have been disposed of.''
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party will benefit the corporation or its security holders;
(b) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did
not participate in the transaction complained of in any capacity. The trial court in this proceeding concluded that ground
(a) was established; its conclusion was amply supported if
the statute is valid and applicable.
Plaintiff's complaint was filed on December 9, 1949; section 834 of the Corporations Code had become effective October 1, 1949; plaintiff became a stockholder not earlier than
March, 1949, on conveyance to him by one Finnegan of 215
shares. All the transactions complained of, with one exception hereinafter noted, occurred prior to plaintiff's becoming
a shareholder. The one transaction excepted (alleged leasing
of property, with option to purchase at below its market
value, to an organization controlled by defendants) assertedly
took place on October 7, 1949, after plaintiff became a stockholder and after the effective date of the statute.
In material substance the complaint alleges: That plaintiff
is the owner of 215 of a total of 1,235 outstanding shares of
the Washington Holding Company, a corporation, and that
the individual defendants concerned on this appeal own, or are
registered as owning, shares in respectively stated numbers
varying from 5 to 643, and aggregating 718; that the corporation, ·washington Holding Company (hereinafter called
Washington), has owned, since 1932, described real and personal property. Four individual defendants, Shoor, Ingold,
Jenkins and Jesson control ·vi!ashington and are the officers
and directors thereof. Other defendants, Powell, Tanner and
Hunt are officers of ·washington. Since the organization of
Washington in 1932, the four individual defendants have
conspired to acquire all the property of Washington to the
exclusion of the other shareholders, by issuing false financial
Rtatements of ·washington, leasing its property to organizations undrr their control for lrRs than its market rental value,
failing to collect such rentals, representing that Mary Eloise
Clark was a director when she was not, selling and acquiring
stock for delinquent stock aRsessments unnecessarily levied
during 1934-1939, and giving, in 1949, as heretofore mentioned, the lease vvith an option to purchase on improper
terms. Tbe individual defendants have concealed the foregoing· from plaintifY'. Since the action was commenced, plaintiff Hogan died and hifl executrix has been substituted in his
place.
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After the complaint was filed, defendants Ingold, Shoor,
Tanner, Powell, Hunt and Jenkins moved, on the grounds
stated in the statute, for an order requiring plaintiff to furnish security as therein provided. Supporting and opposition
affidavits were filed and the matter heard. Pursuant to the
motion, an order was made requiring security, and plaintiff
having failed to furnish it within the time specified, the action was ordered dismissed as to the moving defendants. From
the latter order this appeal is taken.
The affidavits presented on the motion raise various material issues of fact but, since it appears that the trial court
based its order at least in part, and although indirectly, probably controllingly, on its finding, supported by ample evidence, that plaintiff (which term is used herein as indicating
either the decedent who commenced the action or the present
plaintiff) was, with the exception of the one transaction already noted, not the owner, registered or otherwise, of any
stock at the time of any of the transactions or any part thereof
complained of and did not acquire his stock by operation of
law from one who was a stockholder at any such time, we
treat the case on that basis.
Such finding, as above indicated, appears to have been substantially relied upon by the trial court in reaching its conclusion that there is no reasonable probability that prosecution of the cause of action alleged against the moving parties
would benefit the corporation. It is to be noted, however,
that the order dismissing the action is not based on a holding
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; rather, the
court considered the facts as to the time and circumstances
of plaintiff's acquirement of his stock, and the provisions of
subdivision (a) ( 1) of section 834, and placed reliance thereon
in reaching its conclusion that there was no reasonable probability that prosecution of the cause of action alleged would
benefit the corporation, and hence, that it was proper to require plaintiff to furnish security for costs and attorney's
fees in a reasonable amount. As previously mentioned, and
now repeated for emphasis, it was for failure to furnish the
security as ordered that the action was dismissed. Thus as
applied here the statute did not operate to absolutely preclude
plaintiff from maintaining the suit; it merely required him to
furnish the security if he were to proceed further in his
fiduciary capacity.
[la] Plaintiff contends that her decedent as an incident of
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acquiring ownership of the stock by purchase acquired an
unconditional vested property right to come into equity in
a fiduciary capacity and in that role to institute and maintain
this action on behalf of the corporation as to all wrongs complained of and that to impose the conditions prescribed by
section 834 on the institution and maintenance of the action
is to give the statute retroactive effect and illegally deprive
decedent and this plaintiff of a valuable property right. This
contention cannot be sustained; a person has no property
right in being appointed or in acting on his own nomination
as a guardian ad litem. He may nominate himself but he
cannot compel the court to accept his nomination; he has no
property right to be accepted by the court to institute and
maintain an action in the right of another on terms beyond
the control of the court or the Legislature.
[2] It should be observed that section 834 is not designed
and does not operate to deprive a shareholder of any vested
property right. By its very words the section relates solely
to actions which may be ''instituted or maintained in the right
of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder . . . of
shares . . . of such corporation." (Italics added.) [3] Since
the statute is directed only at actions instituted or maintained
"in the right" of the corporation it has no application to
actions or suits seeking directly to enforce personal rights of
shareholders. Stockholders, if they have a personal cause of
action, are still free to sue the corporation, the majority stockholders, or the directors of the corporation, and to recover
for any cause they can establish. It becomes important therefore to clearly understand at once the precise nature of a
stockholder's derivative action.
[4, 5] In Whitten v. Dabney (1915), 171 Cal. 621, 630-631
[ 154 P. 312], this court said: "And here again it becomes
necessary to call attention to the fact that these plaintiffs
have no personal wrongs for which they are entitled to seek
redress in this action. 'The stockholder does not bring such
a suit because his rights have been directly violated, or because
the cause of action is his or because he is entitled to the relief
sought. He is permitted to sue in this manner simply in order
to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court.' (3 Pomeroy's Equity, 3d ed., sec. 1095.) . . . What is the exact situation of a plaintiff in such an action f He is a trustee pure
and simple, seeking in the name of another a recovery for
wrongs that have been committed against that other. His
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position in the litigation is in every legal sense the precise
equivalent of that of the guardian ad litem. The guardian
ad litem stands as the representative of some person incompetent to sue or be sued directly. He is appointed by the court
to represent that incompetent's interests; to prosecute or defend with the highest diligence and good faith. The stockholder beginning this action does not even occupy the position of a creditor suing on his own account and on account of
his fellow-creditors. In the latter case the creditor plaintiff
has a direct personal interest in the litigation, and within
limitations not here necessary to discuss, may deal with that
litigation as his own. But the stockholder acts in purely a
representative capacity. He is a guardian ad litem by virtue
of statutory authority, empowered to do precisely what a
guardian ad litem appointed by a court may do. He has gone
into equity seeking redress for a corporation under disability
to obtain relief itself, precisely as the guardian ad litem goes
into court to obtain like redress for a client under disability
by reason of incompetency or nonage. The principles governing the conduct of a guardian ad litem are in full strictness
applicable to the conduct of such a plaintiff stockholder. Not
only should a plaintiff in such a fiduciary capacity be willing
to take no act that did not first receive the sanction of the
court of equity to which he has appealed, but, more than this,
he is not permitted to take any act without such sanction.
( W ater·man v. Lawrence, 19 Cal. 210 [79 Am.Dec. 212].)
·where an action is prosecuted by a guardian acl litem, the
infant is the real party. (Bowers v. Kanaday, 94 Ga. 209
[21 S.E. 458] .) And the guardian ad litem cannot even be
considered a party to the cause. (Thomason v. Gray, 84 Ala.
559 [4 So. 394] ; Baltimore & Oh1:o R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick,
36 Mel. 619; Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 19 [2 S.E. 176] ; D~cffy v.
Pinard, 41 Vt. 297; Ingram v. Little, L.R. 11 Q.B.Div. 251.)
And what are the principles governing the conduct of a guardian ad litem? It is the right and duty of the court to protect
the interests of the incompetent represented by the guardian
ad l1:tern and to exercise supervision over the conduct of that
guardian." See, also, to like effect, Loeb v. Berman (1933),
217 Cal. 716, 720 [20 P.2cl 685]; Rttssell v. Weyand (1935),
5 Cal.App.2cl 259, 260, 266 [42 P.2d 381]; Spellacy v. Sttperior Court (1937), 23 Cal.App.2d 142, 147 [72 P.2d 262].
Speaking likewise of the character of such suits the United
States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp.
(1948), 337 U.S. 541, 549 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528],
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said :2 "The very nature of the stockholder's derivative action makes it one in the regulation of which the legislature
of a state has wide powers. "'Whatever theory one may hold
as to the nature of the corporate entity, it remains a wholly
artificial creation whose internal relations between management and stockholders are dependent upon state law and may
be subject to most complete and penetrating regulation, either
by public authority or by some form of stockholder action.
Directors and managers, if not technically trustees, occupy
positions of a fiduciary nature, and nothing in the Federal
Constitution prohibits a state from imposing on them the
strictest measure of responsibility, liability and accountability,
either as a condition of assnming office or as a consequence of
holding it.
"Likewise, a stockholder who brings suit on a cause of
action derived from the corporation assumes a position, not
technically as a trnstee perhaps, but one of a fiduciary character. . . . He is a self-chosen representative and a volunteer
champion. The Federal Constitution does not oblige the state
to place its litigating and adjudicating processes at the disposal of snch a representative, at least without imposing
standards of responsibility, liability and accountability which
it considers will protect the interests he elects himself to represent. . . . \Xf e conclucte that the state has plenary power
over this type of litigation. . . .
" [P. 552 J A statr may set the terms on which it will prr2
The Cohen rase, in the question ultimately decided, may be distinguished from the cnse here. Tl1e court there stated its problem as follows (p. 543 of 337 U.S.) : "The ultimate question here is whether a
federal c.ourt, lmving jurisdiction of a stockholder's derivative action
only because the parties :ue of diverse citizenship, must apply a statute
of the forum state which makes the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of the defense and
entitles the corporation to require security for their payment."
The New .Jersey statute which the court was considering was by its
express terms declared applicable to pending actions. The action before
the court had heen commenced about two years he.foye the statute was
enacted. The court therefore had no occasion to consider or rule on
the question as to whether application of the New ,Tersey Jaw woulfl
be purely procedural and prospective in relation to actions instituted
after its effective date. The majority held that the statute even when
applied to create a liability in the pending case, where none had existed
when the action wns r,ommenced, did not breach any constitutional
guaranty and would be npplied in the federal courts.
It would seem that if the statute were substantive, and other than
prospective in operation, giving it effect in a pending action mj.ght
impair the contract obligation or take property without due process.
In the case before us no such problem nrises. The statute itself does
not impose any liability on the plaintiff. If he chooses to bring the suit,
however, he must meet the conditions imposed.

,.
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mit litigations in its courts. No type of litigation is more
susceptible of regulation than that of a fiduciary nature . . .
and we think . . . it is within the power of a state to close
its courts to this type of litigation if the condition of reasonable security is not met.''
[6a] If the power of the state over this type of fiduciary
litigation is plenary, as the Cohen case states, then surely
such litigation is subject to regulation of the type provided
by section 834. [7] And if section 834 is applied only to actions
instituted after its enactment it is neither substantive in character nor retroactive in operation. It does not in and of
itself create any liability or deprive anyone of property or of
any vested right either with or without due process nor does
it impair the obligation of any contract. The stockholder
will not incur any liability for costs if he does not essay to
bring in equity a suit in the corporation's right. If he does
bring such a suit he knows that he will be subject to the regulating provisions of the statute. [8] There is no more reason to
doubt the applicability of the statute to a fiduciary action
brought in respect to wrongs assertedly perpetrated before
the statute than if it concerned wrongs happening after the
statute as long as the action is brought after the effective date
of the legislation. [9] In either case the operation of the
statute is prospective and procedural because it does not deprive a person of any right which he had at the time of beginning the suit, but merely prescribes the conditions upon which
the subsequently instituted equity suit may be brought and
maintained. [10] Obviously, it is only in respect to a claimed
unconditional right to institute and maintain the fiduciary action in the right of the corporation, and to be unconditionally
accepted by the court in that capacity, that plaintiff's claim
of· impairment goes. This is the only claim he can make because it is the only type of action affected by the statute and
the statute does not abolish stockholder's derivative suits but
merely imposes regulatory conditions on their institution and
maintenance. Plaintiff's stock is still his; any personal rights
of action he may possess as attributes or incidents of the stock
are still his and, as already noted, are completely unaffected by
section 834.
[lh] As already pointed out, by bringing a stockholder's derivative action the plaintiff nominates himself to act in a fiduciary capacity substantially as a guardian ad litem for the corpo'ration, and he has no vested property right which compels
the court to accept him unconditionally in that capacity.

1

1
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[6b] The formulation of regulations for that type of litigation
including the determination of what qualifications shall be required of a plaintiff in order that he may institute and maintain a suit in equity "in the right" of another is a matter manifestly appropriate for state legislation, which must be upheld
so long as no constitutiomtl rights are invaded. In the light of
the authorities already cited it is apparent that application of
the statute under the circumstances shown here breaches no
constitutional guaranty.
It may be further observed that even without the enactment
of section 834 the plaintiff here would not have been permitted to maintain the suit (except possibly in relation to
the one transaction alleged to have occurred after he acquired
his stock) had it been brought in or transferred to (as upon
showing a diversity of citizenship) a federal court, and that
this court has never passed upon the question as to the capacity of a shareholder, who was not such at the time of the
wrongs complained of, to maintain a derivative suit. Since
Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co. (sometimes cited as Hawes
v. Oakland) (1881), 104 U.S. 450 [26 L.Ed. 827, 832], it has
been the rule in the federal courts that a complaint in a derivative action must contain ''an allegation that complainant was
a shareholder at the time of the transactions of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by operation of law.''
This rule is now embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (rule 23(b), 28 U.S.C.A.) and is enforceable in
the federal courts even in states which permit derivative
suits without such a showing (Venner v. Great Northern Ry.
Co. (1907), 153 F. 408, 411; affirmed (1908), 209 U.S. 24
[28 S.Ct. 328, 52 L.Ed. 666] ). Decisions of the courts of the
several states are sharply conflicting and strong arguments can
be found in support of either policy. (See anno. 148 A.L.R.
1091, 1097.) In California the only case substantially in
point which has been cited to us or which our research has
disclosed is Harvey v. JJ:leigs (1911), 17 Cal.App. 353, 364
[119 P. 941]. The District Court of Appeal there took the
view that the action could be maintained regardless of when
and how ownership of the stock was acquired. 3 However, in
view of the fact that we regard section 834 as controlling on
•see, also, Beal v. Smith (1920), 46 Cal.App.2d 271 [189 P. 341],
which contains some discussion of the rights of such a shareholder who
was without notice of the alleged fraudulent acts at the time he acquired his shares, but the case is decided on the ground that action was
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this appeal we express no opinion as to ·whether, in the absence
of such statute, we should follow or disapprove Harvey v.

1J!Ieigs.
[11] Insofar as section 834 authorizes the court on motion
and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion to require that
a plaintiff in a deriYatiye 1m it furnish security for "the probable reasonable expenses, inclnclinl!; attorney's fees," of the
defendants sued, "which will be incurred in the defense of
the action,'' and requires dismissal of the action on failure of
the plaintiff to comply with the ot'der within a reasonable time
. fixed by the court, there is no serious question either as to
validity or applicability of the legislation. It is almost universally held that such statutes are not regarded as being
given retroactive effect even when applied to actions pending at the time of enactment. Certainly they are not retroactive when applied to actions subsequently commenced (and
this must be understood as the only respect in which a question is before us or in which we express our view) even though
the cause of action accrued before enactment. [12] 'l'he
general rule is thus stated in 7 California Jurisprudence 305,
§ 43: "[C]osts are given only by statutory direction and their
allowance depends on the terms of the statute in force at the
time of the accrual of the right to have them taxed. 'l'his time,
in regard to costs on appeal, is the time of the rendition of
the judgment on appeal. It follows that the rule pertaining
to the allowance of costs may be changed or modified by stat.
ute during the pendency of the proceeding.'' Directly supporting the above statement, see Turner v. East B-ide Canal
& Irr. Co. (1918), 177 Cal. 570, 571-572 [171 P. 299], and
cases there cited; Wilson v. Nichols (1942), 55 Cal.App.2d
678, 682 [131 P.2d 596] (hearing denied).
[13] In 96 American Law Reports 14:28 (annotation on
''Statute relating to costs or attorneys' fees at commencement
or at termination of action as controlling") the law is epitomized as follows: "It is well settled that the question whether
costs may be allowed in an action or suit, as well as the determination of the method of their computation, is governed
by the law as it exists at the time of the judgment which terminates the action or suit, rather than by the law as it existed
at the time when the action or suit was commenced,-where
barred by the statute of limitations; Earl v. Lofquist (1933), 135 Cal.
App. 373, 376 r27 P.2d 416], which contains a statement of the rule as
announced in Harvey v. Meigs, supra, but again the holding was that
action was barred by the limitations statutes.
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there is no provision in connection with the new legislation
which clearly saves or excepts therefrom costs in pending actions." The numerous illustrative cases which are cited show
that statutes either increasing or decreasing the allowable
costs, including attorney fees, are consistently applied to litigation pending when snch statutes became effective, unless
a contrary intent dearly appears from the statute.
It is noted that in 8hielcrawt v. Moffett (1945), 294 N.Y.
180 [61 N.E.2d 435, 439, 159 A.L.R. 971], an attempt is made
to distinguish between the recognized rule that "Liability for
the payment of costs . . . is ordinarily measured in accordance 1vith the statute in effect at the time when costs and expenses are fixed by order or by judgment of the court, even
though the proceeding may have been initiated before the
statute took effect,'' and the situation here presented of imposing a new requirement that security for such costs be furnished by plaintiff. Whether this attempted distinction is
sound or unsound does not now concern us and we imply no
view on it whatsoever. In either event the case does not support the conclusion that application of section 834 to actions
filed after its enactment would constitute retroactive application. The holding (p. 438 of 61 N.E.) is merely that the
New York statute permitting the corporation defendant to
"require the plaintiff [in a derivative suit] . . . to give security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,"
did not apply to actions pending at the time the statute became effective. Our statute, in its application to the case
before us, involves only its effect on subsequently instituted
actions and the Shielcrawt opinion expressly distinguishes
such cases. The court there says (Shielcmwt v. Moffett
(1945), supra, 294 N.Y. 180 [61 N.E.2d 435, 440, 159 A.L.R.
971] ) : ''If the statute had been in effect when the plaintiffs
instituted this action they might not have been able or willing·
to give the required security; if applied to pending actions it
might prevent these plain tiffs from trying the action after
they had spent time and money in preparing it for trial.
'rhough the Legislature has found that the statute is a just and
reasonable solution of a serious problem, it does not follow
that it would decide that it would be just and reasonable to
apply the statute to actions then pending . . . .
"It is said that, when the Ijegislature provided that the
defendant is entitled to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to
grve secnrity 'in any action instituted or maintained in the
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right of any foreign or domestic corporation,' it disclosed
an intention that the statute should apply not only in actions
thereafter instituted but also in actions previously 'instituted'
and thereafter 'maintained'. The word 'maintained' may be
used in a context where it clearly denotes that it includes
pending actions. (Cf. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose,
289 U.S. 373, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265.) In other context
it has frequently been given other construction. (See cases
collated in 38 C.J., Maintain, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5.) In the statute we
are now construing it is at most equivocal and does not, we
think, disclose an intent of the Legislature that it should be
applied in actions previously instituted.''
[14] Lastly, we are of the view that section 4 of the Corporations Code is pertinent. It provides that "No action . . .
commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued,
is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure
thereafter taken therein shall conform to the provisions of
this code so far as possible. '' Certainly there is nothing in
the quoted language which implies that section 834 shall not
be applied to actions commenced after its effective date.
[15] Since the power of the state over the institution and
maintenance of fiduciary actions of this character is plenary
(Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp. (1948), supra, 337 U.S.
541, 550), there is no "right accrued" in the shareholder (to
be accepted by the court as, in effect, a guardian ad litem for
the corporation) to be affected and the declared policy of the
state as to all procedure to be taken in derivative actions after
the effective date of the statute should be given effect. (See
Smallwood v. Gallardo (1927), 275 U.S. 56, 60-62 [48 S.Ct. 23,
72 L.Ed. 152] .)
For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is
affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The main question presented is whether section 834 of the
Corporations Code is to be applied to past transactions, that
is, retroactively, as in the case at bar. That section requires
two things prerequisite to the maintenance of a derivative action by a corporation shareholder: (1) That he be a registered
stockholder at the time the fraudulent transaction occurred
and at the time of the commencement of the action, and (2)
that he post security guaranteeing the payment of the expenses of the defense of the suit if he is unsuccessful.
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Before discussing the main issue certain pertinent principles should be clarified inasmuch as the majority opinion either
casts serious doubt upon them or repudiates them. The right
to bring such an action is the established law of this state
and elsewhere, except under the rules of procedure of the
federal court, whether the shareholder was or was not a registered owner when the fraud was committed. It is a substantial right whether it be called procedural, property or otherwise. It is the only method whereby the fraud of the corporation management may be exposed and restitution obtained,
contrary to the intimation of the majority opinion. In an
attempt to ameliorate the serious consequence of its holding,
the majority make the following highly misleading statements:
''Stockholders, if they have a personal cause of action, are
still free to sue the corporation, the majority stockholders,
or the directors of the corporation, and to recover for any
cause they can establish. . . . Plaintiff's stock is still his; any
personal rights of action he may possess as attributes or incidents of the stock are still his and, as already noted, are completely unaffected by section 834. '' There can be no doubt
that the majority is fully cognizant of the fact that there is
no other remedy or cause of action known to the law available to obtain the relief sought, other than the one here involved. Historically speaking the remedy here sought is
equitable, as will appear from the discussion to follow.
The majority cite and quote at some length from Whitten
v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621 [154 P. 312] relative to the capacity
of a plaintiff in a so-called derivative action on behalf of a
corporation and emphasis is placed upon the analogy made
in that case between such a plaintiff and a guardian ad litem
in the ordinary civil action. While this analogy strikes me
as being inappropriate for obvious reasons, I can see no basis
for resorting to terminology in order to impair plaintiff's
right to prosecute a derivative action. It should be apparent
that the analogy between a plaintiff in a derivative action
and a guardian ad litem is wholly unrealistic as there is
no requirement whatever that a guardian ad litem have any
interest directly or indirectly in the subject matter or outcome of the litigation. He merely stands in the place of the
plaintiff who lacks capacity to prosecute the action in his own
name. Such is not the case when a corporation is in control
of officers who have committed frauds which have resulted
in pecuniary loss to its stockholders. There is no incapacity
on the part of such corporation to seek redress for the loss
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sustained as the result of the fraudulent conduct of its officers,
but the officers guilty of the fraud will not permit the corporation to sue in its own name to recover for the loss sustained.
Hence, a stockholder who has indirectly suffered such loss
in common with the other stockholders, has the right to prosecute such an action on behalf of himself and those similarly
affected, including the corporation. Such right is a substantial
property right as it may have the effect of substantially increasing the value of the shares of stock owned by the plaintiff
by virtue of requiring the defrauding ofiicers to return to
the corporation the portion of its assets which they have misappropriated or misused to the detriment of not only the
corporation but the shareholders thereof. 'While it is true as
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cohen
v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 [69 S.Ct. 1221,
93 L.Ed. 1528], that the plaintiff in such an action assumes
a position of a fiduciary character, this does not mean that so
far as his own interests are concerned, he is not acting for
himself. The fiduciary capacity in which he serves is with
relation to the corporation and the other stockholders whose
interests he is seeking to advance in common with his own.
The rule here involved is stated in Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations with supporting authorities: "In several of the
states the rule is well settled that a stockholder may sue
although he purchased his shares after the transaction complained of. And it is generally held immaterial that he purchased for the purpose of acquiring the right to sue. A subsequent stockholder cannot recover, however, even under
this majority rule, (1) when he is not a bona fide stockholder,
or (2) when himself guilty of acquiescence in the wrong, or
( 3) when himself guilty of laches, or ( 4) where the transferor
of the stock would have been barred from bringing suit by
laches or acquiescence or the like." (Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations, [Perm. eel.] § 5980.) The opposing view is
chiefly represented by federal cases which are controlled by
a rule of procedure (Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., rule 23 [b])
similar to section 834. (Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations,
[Perm. ed.] § 5981.) The majority rule has been established
in this state. (Harvey v. JJJeigs, 17 Cal.App. 353 [119 P.
941]; see Ead v. Lofquist, 135 Cal.App. 373 [27 P.2d 416];
Beal v. Smith, 46 Cal.App. 271 [189 P. 341].) In the Harvey
case the court said (p. 364): "However this may be, both
plaintiffs in any view have, on the showing made in the complaint, a right to prevent the payment of the fraudulent
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credits shown to stand on the company's books in favor of
defendants. And if the defendants have without consideration and fraudulently appropriated $94,000 of the corporate
funds which should be restored to its treasury, I fail to see why
they have not a cause of action to compel such return, even
though they acquired their shares after such misappropriation.
(See the question fully considered in Just v. Idaho CanaL &
Irr. Co., 16 Idaho 639 [102 P. 381, 133 Am.St.Rep. 140].)"
'fhe majority opinion fails to point out any sound reason why
a transferee of stock should not receive any rights of action
incidental to ownership of the stock which the transferor
had. There is no reason for doubting the soundness of the
rule, for otherwise there is a grave question of discrimination.
If a transferee cannot sue because he did not own stock when
the fraud occurred, it would logically follow that if some
qualified stockholder sued and recovered, the stock of the
transferee could not benefit by the recovery. The benefit
would have to go to his transferor. No one would advocate
such a proposition. Hence it must follow that when the stock
is transferred, the transfer carries with it the right to recover
on behalf of the corporation for past frauds perpetrated by its
officers. An expert in corporation law agrees that it is ''. . . a
sound rule on principle as each share represents an interest
in the entire concern and the several shareholders are entitled
to equal rights irrespective of when they acquired their shares.
The corporate cause of action is enforced for the benefit of
all the shareholders.'' (Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders
Derivative Suits: How Far is California's New "Security
for Expenses" ~4ct Sound Regulation? 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399,
414.)
Further, in this connection, and also pointing out the substantial character of the right, the United States Supreme
Court has this to say in speaking of similar but less drastic
New Jersey legislation than our section 834: "A.s business
enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of incorporation, management became vested with almost uncontrolled
discretion in handling other people's rnoney. The vast aggregate of funds committed to corporate control came to be drawn
to a considerable extent from numerous and scattered holders
of small interests. The director was not subject to an effective
accountability. That created strong temptation for managers
to profit personally at expense of their trust. The business code
became all too tolerant of s~tch practices. Corporate laws were
lax and were not self-enforcing, and stockholders in face of
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gravest abuses, were singularly irn.potent in obtaining redress
of abuses of trust.
"Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no
standing to bring civil action at law against faithless directors
and managers. Equity, however, allowed him to step into
the corporation's shoes andto seek in its right the restitution
he could not demand in his own. It required him first to
demand that the corporation vindicate its own rights, but
when, as was usual, those who perpetrated the wrongs also
were able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear and
adjudge the corporation's cause through its stockholder with
the corporation as a defendant, albeit a rather nominal one.
This remedy, born of stockholder helplessness, was long the
chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded
no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal
of stockholders' interests. It is argued, and not without reason,
that withottt it there would be little practical check on such
abuses." (Italics added.) (Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan
Cm·p., 337 U.S. 541, 547 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528] .)
And, speaking of the statutory requirement for security for
expenses (p. 555): "However, it creates a new liability where
none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes
a derivative action liable for the expense to which he puts
the corporation and other defendants, if he does not make good
his claims. Such liability is not usual and it goes beyond payment of what we know as 'costs.' If all the Act did was to
create this liability, it would clearly be substantive. But this
new liability would be without meaning and value in many
cases if it resulted in nothing but a judgment for expenses
at or after the end of the case. Therefore, a procedure is
prescribed by which the liability is insured by entitling the
corporate defendant to a bond of indemnity before the outlay
is incurred. We do not think a statute which so conditions
the stockholder's action can be disregarded by the federal
court as a mere procedural device." (Italics added.)
In the face of those salutary and established principles
the majority opinion arrives at the conclusion that section
834 was intended to apply to past transactions because, as to
the expense security requirement, it is mere procedure, a
proposition squarely contrary to the Cohen case, which holds
that the requirement is more than for costs. That the statute
would be given retroactive application in the instant case is
clear. The last word by this court on the subject is that :
''A retrospective law is one which affects rights, obligations,
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acts, transactions and conditions which are performed or
exist prior to the adoption of the statute." (Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 30 Cal.2d 388, 391 [182
P.2d 159] .) There is by section 834 a requirement that
security be posted by the plaintiff in derivative actions, and
the plaintiff must have owned the stock when the fraud occurred. The right to maintain the action by one who acquired
stock after the perpetration of the fraud without posting
security for expenses both existed before section 834 was
passed. If that section is applied in this case those rights
are being affected. The new law is one, which in the language
of the Aetna case, affects rights, obligations and conditions
which existed prior to its. adoption. That is true of both the
expense and ownership requirements.
We thus come to the question of whether it was intended
that section 834 should be applied retroactively. "It is an
established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to
be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to
appear that such was the legislative intent . ... It is contended
upon behalf of respondents that this rule of statutory construction has no application to procedural statutes, and that
section 4661 relates solely to matters of procedure or remedy.
Feckenschaer v. Gamble, 12 Cal.2d 482 [85 P.2d 885], City of
Los Angeles v. Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299 [283 P. 298], San
Bernardino Cotmty v. Industrial Ace. Com., 217 Cal. 618 [20
P.2d 673], and Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
l 98 Cal. 631 [246 P. 1046, 46 A.L.R. 1095], are relied upon
in support of the contention. In those cases, with one exception, it was held that the language of the statutes showed
that the Legislature intended them to be applied retroactively,
and the court was concerned mainly with the question of
whether the Legislature has power to give those laws such
retroactive effect. Since the question of the constitutionality
of retroactive legislation and the question of the applicability of
a rule of statutory construction are distinct (Ware v. Heller,
63 Cal.App.2d 817, 821 [148 P.2d 410] ), these cases are not
in point. . . . If substantial changes are made, even in a statute which might ordinarily be classified as procedural, the
operation on existing rights wonld be retroactive because the
legal effects of past events would be changed, and the statute
will be construP,d to operate only in fuhtro unless the legislative
intent to the contrary clearly appears." (Italics added.)
(Aetna Cas. &- Surety Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 30 Cal.2d
388, 393 [182 P.2d 159].) That the change in the law
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wrought by the adoption of section 834 is substantial and
does affect existing rights is too obvious to require further
discussion. True, section 834 states that no action may be
''instituted or maintained,'' but that is not sufficient to abrogate the rule that to be construed as retroactive in operation
on substantial rights a statute must clearly so state. In Shielarawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y.180 [61 N.E.2d 435, 159 A.L.R. 971],
the court had before it a New York statute similarly phrased,
which required posting of security for costs if plaintiff in a
derivative action owned less than a specified percentage of
stock. The court interpreted the statute as not applicable to
an action which was commenced before its adoption, and while
it mentioned a possible distinction between that situation and
where the action was commenced later, it emphasized the
nature of the right affected as substantial and invoked the
rule of construction against retrospective operation, stating
(p. 440 [61 N.E.2d]): "It is said that, when the Legislature
provided that the defendant is entitled to require the plaintiff
or plaintiffs to give security 'in any action instituted or maintained in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation,'
it disclosed an intention that the statute should apply not
only in actions thereafter instituted but also in actions previously 'instituted' and thereafter 'maintained.' The word
'maintained' may be used in a context where it clearly denotes
that it includes pending actions. Cf. George Moore Ice Cream
Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265. In
other context it has frequently been given other construction.
See cases collated in 38 C.J., Maintain §§ 2, 3, 4, 5. In the
statute we are now construing it is at most equivocal and
does not, we think, disclose an intent of the Legislature that
it should be applied in actions previously instituted." A
reasonable interpretation is that the use of the phraseology
in section 834 that no action may be ''instituted or maintained''
unless the stock ownership at the time of the transaction is
alleged, and security is posted if required, is merely another
way of stating that a shareholder has no right of action on
behalf of the corporation unless those conditions exist or are
complied with. Such construction carries no retroactive implication. It does not necessarily point to an intent to have
the statute operate on accrued rights. At best those words
are equivocal and must be read in the light of section 4 of the
Corporations Code that: "No action or proceeding commenced
before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected
by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter
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taken therein shall conform to the provisions of this code
so far as possible.'' True, reference is made to procedural
statutes as applying to pending actions, but "rights" are
also mentioned and here we have involved substantial rights.
Section 4 is .similar to a provision reading: "No part of it is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." ( Civ. Code, § 3;
Code Civ. Proc., § 3; Pol. Code, § 3.) That provision in
those codes has been held to apply to amendments or additions
to them as well as the original codes. (Estate of Frees, 187
Cal. 150 [201 P. 112]; Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer,
116. Cal. 518 [48 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194] ; Blade v. Superior
Court, 102 Cal.A.pp. 375 [283 P. 81].)
Furthermore, it should be remembered that section 834
embraces the requirement of shareholding at the time named
as well as the requirement of security in one cohesive coverage
regulating derivative actions. It is not to be supposed that part
of it is to be retroactive but not the remainder, the security
mandate and stockholder prerequisite, for the first sentence
purports to require all of the conditions to be on the same
footing. There can be no doubt that the stock ownership requirement would operate upon a prior accrued right of vital
importance.
In connection with the ownership requirement it should be
observed that the majority opinion does not discuss that
phase of section 834, with reference to retroactivity. It holds
the expense security requirement either is not being applied
retrospectively, or even if it is, that is a proper construction
of it. If such is true of that part of the section it must also
be true of the ownership requisite, unless it is said that the
parts of the section are severable, a problem heretofore mentioned by me but not even discussed in the majority opinion.
If the majority thinks there is severability, it need not discuss the ownership :feature. Otherwise it must.
The majority opinion endeavors to sidestep the ownership question by the statement: '' A.s previously mentioned,
. . . it was for failure to furnish the security as ordered that
the action was dismissed. Thus as applied here the statute
did not operate to absolutely preclude plaintiff from maintaining the suit; it merely required him to furnish the security
if he were to proceed further in his fiduciary capacity.'' That
is not true in any realistic sense. The majority concedes that
the trial court based its dismissal of the action solely upon the
fact that plaintiff was not an owner of stock when the fraud
was committed. It was on that basis, and that alone, that
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the expense security was ordered by the court. The dismissal
followed when the security was not furnished. But, nevertheless, it was in effect based upon the lack of stock ownership.
It is idle to reason, as does the majority, that plaintiff was not
injured because he could have posted the security and thus
avoided dismissal. If he had supplied it, he would have suffered the burden imposed by section 834, and his complaint
would be subject to dismissal on general demurrer for it shows
that he was not an owner of stock when the fraud occurred.
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are grave questions of constitutionality involving equal protection of the law
which were not decided in Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp.,
supra, 337 U.S. 541, in connection with the requirement that
security be posted to cover expenses including attorney's
fees and that such expenses shall be allowed against the
security if the action is unsuccessful. A situation is presented
where the plaintiff must pay the defendant's attorney's fees
if unsuccessful, but the defendant is not required to pay
plaintiff's counsel fees if the latter wins. Such a statute is
invalid unless there is some reason why plaintiffs are in a
different position than defendants. (See Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co: v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 [43 S.Ct. 55,
67 L.Ed. 115]; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96
[19 S.Ct. 609, 43 L.Ed. 909] .) It may be argued that because
of the danger of spite suits, bad faith suits, by stockholders in
derivative actions it is proper to place those actions in a
separate class, but that cannot apply here. Under section
834 plaintiff is to post security for attorney's fees when it
appears on the motion therefor that the corporation would not
benefit by the action. Suppose the court finds the corporation
would probably benefit by the action, then the corporation
should be required to post security for plaintiff's counsel fees,
a wholly reasonable demand because the corporation is the one
that benefits by the recovery; the action is on its behalf and
ultimately for the good of all stockholders. Section 834 makes
no such provision, however, and for that reason is strongly
suspect of denying equal protection of the law.
I would therefore reverse the order of dismissal.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15,
1952. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

